Članak 32. 📖 GDPR. Sigurnost obrade

Članak 32. GDPR. Sigurnost obrade

Article 32 GDPR. Security of processing

1. Uzimajući u obzir najnovija dostignuća, troškove provedbe te prirodu, opseg, kontekst i svrhe obrade, kao i rizik različitih razina vjerojatnosti i ozbiljnosti za prava i slobode pojedinaca, voditelj obrade i izvršitelj obrade provode odgovarajuće tehničke i organizacijske mjere kako bi osigurali odgovarajuću razinu sigurnosti s obzirom na rizik, uključujući prema potrebi:

1. Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate:

Smjernice i sudska praksa Vezani tekstovi

Smjernice i sudska praksa

(EN)

Documents

EDPB, Guidelines 3/2019 on Processing of Personal Data through Video Devices (2020).

Vezani tekstovi

Guidelines 4/2019 on Article 25 Data Protection by Design and by Default Version 2.0.

2.1.3.1 “state of the art”

18. The concept of “state of the art” is present in various EU acquis, e.g. environmental protection and product safety. In the GDPR, reference to the “state of the art” [8] is made not only in Article 32, for security measures,[9][10] but also in Article 25, thus extending this benchmark to all technical and organisational measures embedded in the processing.

_{[8] See German Federal Constitutional Court’s “Kalkar” decision in 1978: https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=67 may provide the foundation for a methodology for an objective definition of the concept. On that basis, the “state of the art” technology level would be identified between the “existing scientific knowledge and research” technology level and the more established “generally accepted rules of technology”. The “state of the art” can hence be identified as the technology level of a service or technology or product that exists in the market and is most effective in achieving the objectives identified.}

_{[9] https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/what-is-state-of-the-art-in-it-security}

_{[10] www.teletrust.de/en/publikationen/broschueren/state-of-the-art-in-it-security/}

19. In the context of Article 25, the reference to “state of the art” imposes an obligation on controllers, when determining the appropriate technical and organisational measures, to take account of the current progress in technology that is available in the market. The requirement is for controllers to have knowledge of, and stay up to date on technological advances; how technology can present data protection risks or opportunities to the processing operation; and how to implement and update the measures and safeguards that secure effective implementation of the principles and rights of data subjects taking into account the evolving technological landscape.

20. The “state of the art” is a dynamic concept that cannot be statically defined at a fixed point in time, but should be assessed continuously in the context of technological progress. In the face of technological advancements, a controller could find that a measure that once provided an adequate level of protection no longer does. Neglecting to keep up to date with technological changes could therefore result in a lack of compliance with Article 25.

21. The “state of the art” criterion does not only apply to technological measures, but also to organisational ones. Lack of appropriate organisational measures can lower or even completely undermine the effectiveness of a chosen technology. Examples of organisational measures can be adoption of internal policies; up-to date training on technology, security and data protection; and IT security governance and management policies.

22. Existing and recognized frameworks, standards, certifications, codes of conduct, etc. in different fields may play a role in indicating the current “state of the art” within the given field of use. Where such standards exist and provide a high level of protection for the data subject in compliance with – or go beyond – legal requirements, controllers should take them into account in the design and implementation of data protection measures.

(a) pseudonimizaciju i enkripciju osobnih podataka;

(a) the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data;

ISO 27701 Smjernice i sudska praksa

ISO 27701

(EN) ISO/IEC 27701, adopted in 2019, added additional ISO/IEC 27002 guidance for PII controllers.

Here is the relevant paragraph to article 32(1)(a) GDPR:

7.4.5 PII de-identification and deletion at the end of processing

Control

The organization should either delete PII or render it in a form which does not permit identification or re-identification of PII principals, as soon as the original PII is no longer necessary for the identified purpose(s).

Implementation guidance

The organization should have mechanisms to erase the PII when no further processing is anticipated.

(EN) […]

(EN) Sign in
to read the full text

Smjernice i sudska praksa

(EN) Spanish data protection authority (AEPD), Introduction to the hash function as a personal data pseudonymisation technique (2019).

(b) sposobnost osiguravanja trajne povjerljivosti, cjelovitosti, dostupnosti i otpornosti sustava i usluga obrade;

(b) the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services;

ISO 27701

(EN) ISO/IEC 27701, adopted in 2019, added a requirement additional to ISO/IEC 27001, section 6.1.2.

Here is the relevant paragraphs to article 32(1)(b) GDPR:

5.4.1.2 Information security risk assessment

6.1.2 c) 1) is refined as follows:

The organization shall apply the information security risk assessment process to identify risks associated with the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability, within the scope of the PIMS.

(EN) […]

(EN) Sign in
to read the full text

(c) sposobnost pravodobne ponovne uspostave dostupnosti osobnih podataka i pristupa njima u slučaju fizičkog ili tehničkog incidenta;

(c) the ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident;

ISO 27701

(EN) ISO/IEC 27701, adopted in 2019, added a requirement additional to ISO/IEC 27002, section 12.3.1.

Here is the relevant paragraphs to article 32(1)(c) GDPR:

6.9.3.1 Information backup

Implementation guidance

The organization should have a policy which addresses the requirements for backup, recovery and restoration of PII (which can be part of an overall information backup policy) and any further requirements (e.g. contractual and/or legal requirements) for the erasure of PII contained in information held for backup requirements.

(EN) […]

(EN) Sign in
to read the full text

(d) proces za redovno testiranje, ocjenjivanje i procjenjivanje učinkovitosti tehničkih i organizacijskih mjera za osiguravanje sigurnosti obrade.

(d) a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing.

ISO 27701

(EN) ISO/IEC 27701, adopted in 2019, added a requirement additional to ISO/IEC 27002, section 18.2.1.

Here is the relevant paragraphs to article 32(1)(d) GDPR:

6.15.2.1 Independent review of information security

Implementation guidance

Where an organization is acting as a PII processor, and where individual customer audits are impractical or can increase risks to security, the organization should make available to customers, prior to entering into, and for the duration of, a contract, independent evidence that information security is implemented and operated in accordance with the organization’s policies and procedures.

(EN) […]

(EN) Sign in
to read the full text

2. Prilikom procjene odgovarajuće razine sigurnosti u obzir se posebno uzimaju rizici koje predstavlja obrada, posebno rizici od slučajnog ili nezakonitog uništenja, gubitka, izmjene, neovlaštenog otkrivanja osobnih podataka ili neovlaštenog pristupa osobnim podacima koji su preneseni, pohranjeni ili na drugi način obrađivani.

2. In assessing the appropriate level of security account shall be taken in particular of the risks that are presented by processing, in particular from accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.

ISO 27701 Uvodne izjave

ISO 27701

(EN) ISO/IEC 27701, adopted in 2019, added a requirement additional to ISO/IEC 27001, section 4.3.

Here is the relevant paragraphs to article 32(2) GDPR:

5.2.3 Determining the scope of the information security management system

When determining the scope of the PIMS, the organization shall include the processing of PII.

(EN) […]

(EN) Sign in
to read the full text

Uvodne izjave

(83) Kako bi se očuvala sigurnost i spriječila obrada kojom se krši ova Uredba, voditelj obrade ili izvršitelj obrade trebali bi procijeniti rizike povezane s obradom i provesti mjere za njihovo umanjivanje, kao što je enkripcija. Tim bi se mjerama trebala osigurati odgovarajuća razina zaštite uključujući povjerljivost, uzimajući u obzir najnovija dostignuća i troškove provedbe u odnosu na rizike i prirodu osobnih podataka koji se trebaju zaštititi Prilikom procjene rizika za sigurnost podataka u obzir bi trebalo uzeti rizike koje predstavlja obrada osobnih podataka poput slučajnog ili nezakonitog uništenja, gubitka, izmjene, neovlaštenog odavanja ili pristupa osobnim podacima koji su preneseni, pohranjeni ili na drugi način obrađivani, a što osobito može dovesti do fizičke, materijalne ili nematerijalne štete.

(83) In order to maintain security and to prevent processing in infringement of this Regulation, the controller or processor should evaluate the risks inherent in the processing and implement measures to mitigate those risks, such as encryption. Those measures should ensure an appropriate level of security, including confidentiality, taking into account the state of the art and the costs of implementation in relation to the risks and the nature of the personal data to be protected. In assessing data security risk, consideration should be given to the risks that are presented by personal data processing, such as accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed which may in particular lead to physical, material or non-material damage.

3. Poštovanje odobrenog kodeksa ponašanja iz članka 40. ili odobrenog mehanizma certificiranja iz članka 42. može se iskoristiti kao element za dokazivanje sukladnosti sa zahtjevima iz stavka 1. ovog članka.

3. Adherence to an approved code of conduct as referred to in Article 40 or an approved certification mechanism as referred to in Article 42 may be used as an element by which to demonstrate compliance with the requirements set out in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ISO 27701 Vezani tekstovi

ISO 27701

(EN) ISO/IEC 27701, adopted in 2019, added a requirement additional to ISO/IEC 27001, section 4.1.

Here is the relevant paragraph to article 32(3) GDPR:

5.2.1 Understanding the organization and its context

The organization shall include among its interested parties (see ISO/IEC 27001:2013, 4.2), those parties having interests or responsibilities associated with the processing of PII, including the PII principals.

(EN) […]

(EN) Sign in
to read the full text

Vezani tekstovi

Članak 40. GDPR. Kodeksi ponašanja

Article 40 GDPR. Codes of conduct

Članak 42. GDPR. Certificiranje

Article 42 GDPR. Certification

4. Voditelj obrade i izvršitelj obrade poduzimaju mjere kako bi osigurali da svaki pojedinac koji djeluje pod odgovornošću voditelja obrade ili izvršitelja obrade, a koji ima pristup osobnim podacima, ne obrađuje te podatke ako to nije prema uputama voditelja obrade, osim ako je to obvezan učiniti prema pravu Unije ili pravu države članice.

4. The controller and processor shall take steps to ensure that any natural person acting under the authority of the controller or the processor who has access to personal data does not process them except on instructions from the controller, unless he or she is required to do so by Union or Member State law.

ISO 27701

(EN) ISO/IEC 27701, adopted in 2019, added additional ISO/IEC 27002 guidance for PII controllers.

Here is the relevant paragraph to article 32(4) GDPR:

7.2.1 Identify and document purpose

Control

The organization should identify and document the specific purposes for which the PII will be processed.

Implementation guidance

The organization should ensure that PII principals understand the purpose for which their PII is processed. It is the responsibility of the organization to clearly document and communicate this to PII principals.

(EN) […]

(EN) Sign in
to read the full text

Opća uredba o zaštiti podataka (GDPR)

General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR)

The latest consolidated version of the Regulation with corrections by Corrigendum, OJ L 127, 23.5.2018, p. 2 ((EU) 2016/679). Source: EUR-lex.

Uvodne izjave Smjernice i sudska praksa Ostavite komentar

Uvodne izjave

(74) Trebalo bi uspostaviti dužnosti i odgovornosti voditelja obrade za svaku obradu osobnih podataka koju provede sm voditelj obrade ili netko drugi u ime voditelja obrade. Osobito, voditelj obrade trebao bi imati obvezu provođenja odgovarajućih i djelotvornih mjera te biti u mogućnosti dokazati usklađenost aktivnosti obrade s ovom Uredbom uključujući i djelotvornost mjera. Tim bi mjerama u obzir trebalo uzeti prirodu, opseg, kontekst i svrhe obrade te rizik za prava i slobode pojedinaca.

(74) The responsibility and liability of the controller for any processing of personal data carried out by the controller or on the controller's behalf should be established. In particular, the controller should be obliged to implement appropriate and effective measures and be able to demonstrate the compliance of processing activities with this Regulation, including the effectiveness of the measures. Those measures should take into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing and the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.

(75) Rizik za prava i obveze pojedinaca, različitih vjerojatnosti i ozbiljnosti, može proizaći iz obrade osobnih podataka koja bi mogla prouzročiti fizičku, materijalnu ili nematerijalnu štetu, posebno ako ta obrada može dovesti do diskriminacije, krađe identiteta ili prijevare, financijskog gubitka, štete za ugled, gubitka povjerljivosti osobnih podataka zaštićenih poslovnom tajnom, neovlaštenog obrnutog postupka pseudonimizacije, ili bilo koje druge znatne gospodarske ili društvene štete; ili ako ispitanici mogu biti uskraćeni za svoja prava i slobode ili spriječeni u obavljanju nadzora nad svojim osobnim podacima; ako se obrađuju osobni podaci koji odaju rasno ili etničko podrijetlo, politička mišljenja, vjerska ili filozofska uvjerenja, članstvo u sindikatu i ako je riječ o obradi genetičkih podataka, podataka koji se odnose na zdravlje ili spolni život ili kaznene osude i kažnjiva djela ili povezane sigurnosne mjere; ako se procjenjuju osobni aspekti, osobito analiza ili predviđanje aspekata u vezi s učinkom na poslu, ekonomskim stanjem, zdravljem, osobnim preferencijama ili interesima, pouzdanošću ili ponašanjem, lokacijom ili kretanjem kako bi se izradili ili upotrebljavali osobni profili; ako se obrađuju osobni podaci osjetljivih pojedinaca, osobito djece; ili ako obrada uključuje veliku količinu osobnih podataka i utječe na velik broj ispitanika.

(75) The risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, of varying likelihood and severity, may result from personal data processing which could lead to physical, material or non-material damage, in particular: where the processing may give rise to discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, or any other significant economic or social disadvantage; where data subjects might be deprived of their rights and freedoms or prevented from exercising control over their personal data; where personal data are processed which reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religion or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, data concerning health or data concerning sex life or criminal convictions and offences or related security measures; where personal aspects are evaluated, in particular analysing or predicting aspects concerning performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movements, in order to create or use personal profiles; where personal data of vulnerable natural persons, in particular of children, are processed; or where processing involves a large amount of personal data and affects a large number of data subjects.

(76) Vjerojatnost i ozbiljnost rizika za prava i slobode ispitanika trebala bi se određivati s obzirom na prirodu, opseg, kontekst i svrhe obrade. Rizik bi trebalo procjenjivati na temelju objektivne procjene kojom se utvrđuje uključuju li postupci obrade podataka rizik ili visoki rizik.

(76) The likelihood and severity of the risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subject should be determined by reference to the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing. Risk should be evaluated on the basis of an objective assessment, by which it is established whether data processing operations involve a risk or a high risk.

(77) Upute za provedbu odgovarajućih mjera i za dokazivanje poštovanja odredaba od strane voditelja obrade ili izvršitelja obrade, posebno u pogledu utvrđivanja rizika povezanog s obradom, njihove procjene s obzirom na podrijetlo, prirodu, vjerojatnost i težinu te utvrđivanje najboljih praksi za umanjivanje rizika, osobito bi se mogle pružiti putem odobrenih kodeksa ponašanja, odobrenih certifikata, smjernica koje pruža Odbor ili naznakama koje pruža službenik za zaštitu podataka. Odbor može također izdati smjernice o postupcima obrade za koje se smatra da nije vjerojatno da će dovesti do visokog rizika za prava i slobode pojedinaca i navesti koje mjere mogu u takvim slučajevima biti dovoljne za suočavanje s navedenim rizikom.

(77) Guidance on the implementation of appropriate measures and on the demonstration of compliance by the controller or the processor, especially as regards the identification of the risk related to the processing, their assessment in terms of origin, nature, likelihood and severity, and the identification of best practices to mitigate the risk, could be provided in particular by means of approved codes of conduct, approved certifications, guidelines provided by the Board or indications provided by a data protection officer. The Board may also issue guidelines on processing operations that are considered to be unlikely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons and indicate what measures may be sufficient in such cases to address such risk.

Smjernice i sudska praksa

(EN)

Document

Working Party 29, Opinion 2/2006 on privacy issues related to the provision of email screening services (2006).

CNIL (France): CNIL Guide. Security of Personal Data (2018).

Data Protection Commission (Ireland): Guidance for Controllers on Data Security (2020).

IT Security Association Germany (TeleTrusT) , Guideline “State of the Art”. Technical and organisational measures (2020).

EDPB, Guidelines on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (2020).

EDPB, Guidelines 3/2020 on the Processing of Data Concerning Health for the Purpose of Scientific Research in the Context of the Covid-19 Outbreak (2020).

EDPB, Guidelines 3/2019 on Processing of Personal Data through Video Devices (2020).

Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO, Great Britain), Right of Access (2020).

DPC (Ireland), Guidance for Individuals who Accidentally Receive Personal data (2020).

Case Law

CJEU, Worten – Equipamentos para o Lar SA/Autoridade para as condições de trabalho, C-342-12 (2013).

ICO, Ticketmaster UK Limited (Penalty Notice) (2020).

The ICO found that the company failed to put appropriate security measures in place to prevent a cyber-attack on a chat-bot installed on its online payment page.

The ICO found that Ticketmaster failed to:

Assess the risks of using a chat-bot on its payment page

Identify and implement appropriate security measures to negate the risks

Identify the source of suggested fraudulent activity in a timely manner

Ostavite komentar

[js-disqus]